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Contemporary policy debates on the macroeconomics of resource booms often concentrate on the short-
run Dutch disease effects of public expenditure, ignoring the possible long-term effects of alternative 
revenue-allocation options and the supply-side impact of royalty-financed public investments. In a simple 
model applied here, the government decides the level and timing of resource-rent spending. This model 
also considers productivity spillovers over time, which may exhibit a sector bias toward domestic 
production or exports. A dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model is used to simulate the 
effect of temporary oil revenue inflows to Ghana. The simulations show that beyond the short-run Dutch 
disease effects, the relationship between windfall profits, growth, and households’ welfare is less 
straightforward than what the simple model of the “resource curse” suggests. The DCGE model results 
suggest that designing a rule that allocates oil revenues to both productivity-enhancing investments and an 
oil fund is crucial to achieving shared growth and macroeconomic stability.  
 
 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Average growth rates of 5 percent and a halving of poverty over the past two decades make Ghana a 
recent success story and a rising star in African development (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2008; World Bank 
2008a). Yet the country remains dependent on relatively few sources of foreign exchange inflows and 
retains a high level of external debt (IMF 2008). Therefore, the recent discovery of offshore oil is seen by 
many as an opportunity to overcome persisting structural weaknesses and has raised Ghana’s prospects of 
becoming a frontrunner in African development. However, experiences from other African countries such 
as Nigeria and Zambia show that properly managing resource windfalls remains a challenge for many 
developing countries and that misguided allocation strategies can harm the process of economic 
development instead of accelerating growth (Gelb and Associates 1988; Auty 1990; Rodrik 2003). Cross-
country evidence confirms that countries depending heavily on natural resources tend to have less trade 
and foreign investment, more corruption, less equality, less political liberty, less education, less domestic 
investment, and less financial depth (Gylfason 2005 and Gylfason 2007). 
Given this inherent risk, two extreme positions for managing oil revenue inflows can be 
distinguished.
1 Proponents of a “conservative” strategy, such as the Bank of Ghana (2007, 2008), argue 
that government spending of mineral windfalls often leads to excessive Dutch disease effects,
2
Advocates of a “big push” strategy argue that developing countries often run fiscal and trade 
deficits in development periods of rapid economic growth. Revenues from newly found oil resources 
therefore provide an opportunity to increase government investment to support growth. In fact, public 
investments that facilitate private-sector-led growth and raise productivity have been identified as an 
important component for many countries that transitioned rapidly from low- to middle-income status 
(Syrquin 1988; Collier 2006; Breisinger and Diao 2009).
 where 
exchange-rate appreciation and competition for domestic resources causes a reduction in the 
competitiveness of non-oil sectors, and corruption further undermines effective spending (Gylfason, 
Herbertsson, and Zoega 1999; Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth 2002; Gelb and Turner 2007). Moreover, 
notoriously volatile world oil prices and the physical limitations of mineral resources compound the 
importance of a sound revenue-management strategy. From this perspective, the Norwegian model 
(essentially the saving of resource inflows in an oil fund) constitutes an important tool to phase in and out 
of oil-revenue spending and thus to support a balanced budget, a reduction in foreign debts, and the 
accumulation of savings for future generations (see, for example, Gylfason 2007; Matsen and Torvik 
2005). 
3
Avoiding the resource curse and turning future oil windfalls into an opportunity to accelerate 
economic transformation in Ghana will therefore require sound fiscal management and a strategy that 
balances current government spending and savings. In this paper, we focus on the allocation of oil 
revenues and use a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model to assess trade-offs between 
different spending and saving scenarios. The DCGE model includes different types of public spending 
and also introduces an oil fund. To calibrate the model’s baseline (2009 to 2027), we draw information 
from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) current account, government balance, and interest 
 In countries such as Indonesia and Chile, public 
investments in agriculture and rural development financed by oil and copper revenues have played an 
important supporting role in growth and structural transformation (Temple 2003). However, cross-country 
empirical evidence suggests that the impact of resource inflows critically depends on initial conditions, 
especially on the strength of institutions and human capital (Brunnschweiler 2008; Bulte, Damania, and 
Deacon 2005; Gelb and Grassman 2008). 
                                                       
1 For a comprehensive overview of these and intermediate positions, see van der Ploeg (2006). 
2 There is broad agreement that strong appreciation of the real exchange rate hurt the competitiveness of export sectors. 
However, Matsen and Torvik (2005) show that some real appreciation might be optimal, given the inflow of resources and the 
potential to change the growth path of the economy.  
3 The case studies included in Collier and Gunning (1998a, 1998b) center on the savings response of public and private 
agents when faced with trade shocks.  
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payments projections. We then use the oil revenue projections of the IMF and the Institute of Social and 
Statistical Economic Research (ISSER), a local think tank, to assess the trade-offs between 
macroeconomic stability and productivity-enhancing public investments. As two extreme cases, we 
consider a scenario in which the government spends all oil revenues it receives annually and a scenario in 
which the government saves all oil revenues by creating an oil fund and spends only the interest earned 
from the fund. We also introduce an allocation rule, which allows smoothing of oil-revenue spending, 
whereby a part of the oil revenue in each period is saved for future government spending, thereby 
balancing current and future government spending.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the size of the 
future oil sector in the Ghanaian economy and discusses related opportunities and challenges in terms of 
balancing growth acceleration and macroeconomic stability. Section 3 introduces the DCGE model used 
for this study, and Section 4 presents the allocation of oil revenues and the potential impact of this 
allocation together with the model simulation results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
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2.  A NEW ERA OF OIL IN GHANA: NEW CHALLENGES FOR  
GROWTH AND MACRO STABILITY 
Oil was discovered off the coast of Ghana in 2007, with total reserves estimated at between 500 million 
and 1.5 billion barrels and the potential for future government revenues estimated at US$1–1.5 billion 
annually (Table 1). Even at a modest long-term oil price of US$60 per barrel over the next 20 years, oil 
revenues will add around 30 percent to government income and will constitute between 6 and 9 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) annually over the period of exploitation. While the relative amount of 
expected oil revenue is smaller than in other resource-rich countries, the positive shock does provide new 
opportunities to further accelerate growth and speed up economic transformation. Prospects are further 
raised by Ghana’s sound institutional record.  
Table 1. Projection of oil production and revenues 
   2010  2015  2020  2025  2030 
Barrels per day (in 1,000s)  120  250  250  250  250 
Barrels per year (365 days)  43,800  91,250  91,250  91,250  91,250 
           
Oil value (per day, in 1,000s)           
   US$60 per barrel  7,200  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000 
   US$80 per barrel  9,600  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000 
           
Oil value (per year, in 1,000s)           
   US$60 per barrel  2,628,000  900,000  900,000  900,000  900,000 
   US$80 per barrel  3,504,000  7,300,000  7,300,000  7,300,000  7,300,000 
           
Government revenue per day (in 1,000 cedis)       
   US$60 per barrel  2,750  5,730  5,730  5,730  5,730 
   US$80 per barrel  3,667  7,640  7,640  7,640  7,640 
           
Government revenue per year (in 1,000 cedis)       
   US$60 per barrel  1,003,896  1,343,800  1,343,800  1,343,800  1,343,800 
   US$80 per barrel  1,338,528  2,788,600  2,788,600  2,788,600  2,788,600 
Source: Osei and Domfe (2008) 
 
Compared with other African countries in which oil or other natural resources have been 
discovered in the past, current conditions in Ghana seem favorable to avoiding the resource curse. First, 
Ghana has experience in managing resource windfalls. Gold and cocoa have been the most important 
export commodities throughout the country’s entire modern history. After the structural adjustment 
program implemented in the mid-1980s, the country has finally reached macroeconomic stability, and 
these favorable macroeconomic conditions, together with other pro-growth and pro-poor strategies, have 
led to steady growth and rapid poverty reduction over the past 20 years.  
Second, politically, Ghana has become a stable democratic state, as demonstrated by peaceful 
transitions of power in two consecutive free and fair elections, in 2000 and 2008. Third, the governance 
indicators reported by the World Bank show that Ghana has been steadily improving its governance, and 
in 2007 the country ranked above the regional averages for Asia, Latin America, and Africa in most 
important governance indicators, such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of 
corruption (World Bank 2008b; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008).   
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Yet several growth-, equity-, and macrostability-related challenges must still be addressed before 
Ghana can achieve its development goals. The country aims to become a middle-income country by 2015, 
and achieving this development goal will require annual growth rates of around 7 percent over the next 10 
years (NDPC 2005; Breisinger, Diao, and Thurlow 2009). While this goal seems reasonable given the size 
of expected oil revenues, this growth requirement is higher than the growth rates that the country has 
achieved in recent years under favorable international conditions. In addition, the large share of 
agriculture in GDP (about 40 percent), the high share of agriculture-related processing in manufacturing 
(about 60 percent), and the high share of the population working in agriculture (about 70 percent) indicate 
that without Green Revolution–type agricultural growth as a main driver, Ghana may well fail to achieve 
such rapid growth (Breisinger et al. 2008). 
The pattern of current growth reveals certain weaknesses in promoting private investment, 
generating more employment opportunities, and encouraging economic diversification. The distribution 
of growth benefits has also started to show warning signs, as income growth in lagging northern regions 
does not match the fast growth in the coastal regions (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2008).  
Lessons from other countries, and from Ghana’s own history, show that maintaining 
macroeconomic stability is crucial for sustainable growth (Bank of Ghana 2007, 2008). Before 
implementation of the structural adjustment program in the mid-1980s, inefficient public expenditure 
schemes, overvalued exchange rates, trade protection, and an oversized public sector held Ghana back 
from transforming its economy (Agyeman Duah, Soyinka, and Kelly 2008). While Ghana also benefited 
from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief in 2002 to restore macroeconomic balance 
(IMF 2008), new debt has started to reaccumulate recently due to rapidly increasing fiscal deficits. The 
fiscal deficit constituted about 3 percent of GDP in 2005, yet it is expected to reach more than 10 percent 
in 2009 (IMF 2008). The IMF estimates that public debt will rise to more than 50 percent of GDP in 
2009, and other sources’ estimations are even higher (EIU 2009). Osei and Domfe (2008) argue that the 
food and energy crisis is the reason for part of the additional spending. Other sources emphasize the sharp 
increase in recurrent spending (especially for civil servants’ wages) and the stagnation of the share of 
investment in spending (EIU 2009).  
Reducing these high deficits to 5 percent of GDP would require an average annual growth rate of 
7.7 percent to stabilize total public debt at 65 percent of GDP. Therefore, oil revenues must help sustain a 
high spending-to-GDP ratio and will not be available for additional spending.
4
                                                       
4 For more details, see Breisinger et al. (2009). 
 Hence, using these 
revenues to spur productivity-led growth is critical to achieving growth and sustainable debt levels in the 
long run. Striking the right balance between growth and macroeconomic stability in the spending of oil 
revenues will therefore be a key challenge. In the following section we describe a model to address the 
question of what this balance might look like.  
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3.  MODELING ALTERNATIVE OIL REVENUE ALLOCATION OPTIONS 
The ability to capture synergies, trade-offs, and linkages between macroeconomic balances and growth at 
the sector and household level have made general equilibrium models an important tool to analyze the 
impacts of resource booms. In this paper, we therefore use a recursive DCGE model for Ghana. While 
this model does not attempt to make precise predictions about the future development of the Ghanaian 
economy, it does measure the trade-offs between the alternative options of saving and spending oil 
revenues.  
The DCGE model is constructed consistent with the neoclassical general equilibrium theory. The 
theoretical background and the analytical framework of CGE models have been well documented in 
Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982), while the detailed mathematical presentation of a static CGE 
model is described in Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002). A full description of the DCGE model from 
which our Ghana model is developed can be found in Thurlow (2004). The equations and parameters are 
presented in Appendix B.  
The Ghana DCGE model is an economywide, multisectoral model that solves simultaneously and 
endogenously for both quantities and prices of a series of economic variables. On the supply side, the 
model defines specific production functions for each economic activity. Assumptions that are made 
before calibrating the model to the data include constant returns to scale technology with constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) between primary inputs. This is a necessary assumption for the model to 
reach a general equilibrium solution. For the substitution between primary and intermediate inputs in the 
production functions, we assume a Leontief technology.  
The demand side of the DCGE model is dominated by a series of consumer demand functions. 
This demand system is derived from well-defined utility functions. In our model, the consumer demand 
functions are solved from a Stone-Geary type of utility function in which the income elasticity deviates 
from 1 (which is a typical assumption in a Cobb-Douglas type of utility function), and hence the marginal 
budget share of each good consumed differs from its respective average budget share. As in other general 
equilibrium models, consumers’ income that enters the demand system is an endogenous variable in our 
model. Income generated from the primary factors employed in the production process is the dominating 
income source for consumers, while the model also considers incomes from abroad (as remittance 
received) or the government (as direct transfers).  
The DCGE model explicitly models the relationship between supply and demand, which 
determines the equilibrium prices in domestic markets. To capture the linkages between the domestic and 
international markets, the model assumes price-sensitive substitution (imperfect substitution) between 
foreign goods and domestic production.
5
The model has a neoclassical closure in which total domestic investment is determined by the 
sum of private, public (budget surplus), and foreign savings (current account deficit), net of public 
savings abroad in the natural resource funds. Public investment is assumed to be a fixed proportion of 
overall domestic investment, while private investment is constrained by total savings net of public 
investment, where household savings propensities are exogenous. This rule, broadly consistent with 
conditions in developing countries where unrationed access to world capital markets is virtually zero and 
domestic private saving is relatively interest inelastic, means that any shortfall in government savings 
relative to the cost of government capital formation, net of exogenous foreign savings, directly crowds out 
private investment (and any excess in government savings directly crowds in private investment). 
 While the linkages between demand and supply through changes 
in income (an endogenous variable) and productivity (often an exogenous variable) are the most 
important general equilibrium interactions in an economywide model, production linkages also occur 
across sectors through intermediate demand and competition for primary factors employed in production 
sectors. 
                                                       
5 Appendix Table A.1 provides selected indicators of the export orientation of individual sectors and the import dependence 
of domestic demand, together with information on sectoral production and employment structure.  
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The model has a simple recursively dynamic structure. Each solution run tracks the economy over 
the period 2007 to 2027, in which each period also corresponds to a fiscal year. While public and private 
capital stocks are fixed within each year, they accumulate over time. Capital accumulation is affected 
both by savings (particularly for private capital accumulation) and government decisions regarding the 
allocation of public funds. Investment (and hence capital accumulation) is also affected by the foreign 
inflow of capital, in which new oil revenues become an important component in the simulations. 
Distribution of increased capital across sectors is determined by the relative return to sector capital, and 
such returns are the endogenous variables in a general equilibrium model. Specifically, the accumulation 
of sectoral capital stock is defined as follows: 
 
Ki,t = Ki,t-j(1-μi) + ΔKi,t-j          (1) 
 
where Ki,t is the capital stock, μi is the rate of depreciation that is sector specific, and t-j measures the 
gestation lag on investment. In the simulations presented below, the default setting is j = 1, although the 
effects of assuming that public investment augments the stock of infrastructure capital only with a longer 
lag may also be examined. 
The model also considers the effects of public investment on productivity as an externality factor 
resulting from public investment in infrastructure. Public investment is assumed to generate a Hicks-
neutral improvement in total factor productivities. Specifically, the shift parameter in the production 
function, Ai, changes corresponding to the accumulation of public capital, that is, 
 






sg          (2) 
 
where g denotes a set of public capital stocks generally defined over infrastructure, health, and education, 
K
g and Qs are the public capital stocks and sectoral output levels under the simulation experiment, and K
g
0 
and Qs,0 are the correspondingly defined public capital stocks and output levels in the base period. The 
terms ρsg determine the extent of the spillovers of public investment to total factor productivities. If ρsg = 
0, there is no spillover from public investment in infrastructure, health, and education. The higher ρsg, the 
higher the spillover effect. 
We calibrate this model to a new 2007 social accounting matrix (SAM) for Ghana, which is based 
on a 2005 SAM documented in IFPRI 2007. To update this SAM to 2007, we use national accounts 
provided by Ghana Statistical Services (GSS) for 2007, balance of payments data provided by the Bank of 
Ghana, and government budget data provided by the Ministry of Finance. The newly developed SAM 
provides information on the demand and production structure of eight sectors, including two agricultural 
subsectors (domestic and export), four industrial subsectors (mining, manufacturing, utilities, 
construction), and two service subsectors (private and public). The SAM and hence the DCGE model 
consider the existence of three different types of factors—labor, capital, and land—from which rural and 
urban households derive their income (see Appendix Table A.2). 
In addition to the SAM, the main elasticities include the substitution elasticity between primary 
inputs in the production function, the elasticity between domestically produced and consumed goods and 
exported or imported goods, and the income elasticity in the demand functions. We use the same CES 
elasticity of 0.75 in the production function of all individual sectors and for all pairs of production factors, 
which is drawn from the CGE literature on other African countries. The other parameters or coefficients 
in the production functions of the model (e.g., the marginal product of each input) can be directly 
calibrated using the country data of the Ghana SAM (e.g., the share of value-added for each input used in 
the total value-added of this sector).  
For the use of intermediate inputs in the production function, we use a Leontief technology. With 
this assumption, a set of fixed input-output coefficients can be directly derived using the data of the 
Ghana SAM. With a Stone-Geary type of utility function applied in the model, the marginal budget share 
(MBS) is the parameter applied in the demand system, which can be derived from the SAM given that the 
income elasticity of demand is known. The income elasticity is estimated from a semi-log inverse  
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function suggested by King and Byerlee (1978) and based on the data of Ghana Living Standard Survey 
(GLSS5 2005/06). The estimated results, together with the average budget share (ABS) for each 
individual commodity consumed by each individual household group directly calculated using the data of 
the Ghana SAM, provide a series of MBSs that are applied in the model (see Appendix Table A.3). 
For commodities that are sold both domestically and abroad, a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function is applied, while for commodities that have both domestic and foreign 
supply, a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) or Armington function is used. To reflect the relative 
openness of Ghana’s economy, we chose high values, of 4.0, for both the CET and Armington elasticity 
for all traded goods.  
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4.  IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE OIL REVENUE ALLOCATION OPTIONS 
We use this model to assess the medium- and long-term impacts of four alternative oil revenue allocation 
options. This section first describes the scenarios in greater detail and then discusses the core results and 
sensitivity results.  
Scenarios 
The DCGE model is first applied to a scenario (the base run) in which the sectoral-level growth rate is 
consistent with the growth trends observed in recent years (between 2001 and 2007). Newly found oil is 
not considered in this scenario. Along this business-as-usual growth path, Ghana’s economy will continue 
to grow at an annual rate of 5.6 percent until 2027.  
Oil extraction will be conducted offshore, and the linkages to the domestic economy are expected 
to be very weak. Backward linkages will be restricted by the lack of local capacity to provide the highly 
technology-, capital-, and skill-intensive inputs required for setting up and running oil extraction 
businesses (Seminar at the Bank of Ghana on June 30, 2009, and personal interview with Ministry of 
Energy, July 1, 2009). Forward linkages are also likely to be limited, since Ghana does not currently have 
refining capacities and oil is expected to be exported as crude oil. The most important effect from oil 
extraction in Ghana will therefore be the royalties and taxes paid by the consortium of oil companies.
6
We then develop four policy scenarios in which oil revenue as part of new foreign inflows to the 
government account is equivalent to 8.5 percent of GDP in 2007 (the base year in the model).
 
Accordingly, we model the oil boom as an increase in foreign exchange revenues to the government in the 
model.  
7
Total oil revenues are then modeled as foreign inflows, which are either exclusively used to 
finance increased public investment (scenario 1) or are allocated as savings into an interest-earning 
external oil fund (scenario 2).
 This 
projection of oil revenues is based on Osei and Domge from ISSER (2008), which has been summarized 
in Table 1 above.  
8 Interests and revaluation gains (and losses) earned from such savings are 
used to finance public investments in scenario 2.
9
Designs of these scenarios are based on some other countries’ practices. In order to guard against 
the destabilizing impacts of swings in public expenditure, certain fiscal rules have proved useful in 
anchoring long-term fiscal policy and in ensuring that windfall revenues are saved as a cushion against 
future adverse shocks. The best-known example of successful fiscal rules is Norway (Larsen 2006), where 
spending effects are controlled by the government shielding the economy through fiscal discipline and 
investments abroad. Accumulating oil revenues in an oil fund would allow the fiscal budget to be 
supported by a moderate but permanent income stream stemming from interest on these assets. Saving at 
least part of the oil revenues would therefore provide some support to the budget, while at the same time 
moderating real appreciation and building up assets for buffering future shocks to foreign exchange 
inflows and/or fiscal revenues. Accordingly, the government of Ghana has proposed the establishment of 
some form of permanent income fund. However, the details of this plan, in terms of what proportion to 
 Scenarios 3 and 4 examine the combination of these 
two extreme cases, in which only part of the royalties are saved in the oil fund following different 
allocation rules. Finally, variations of these four basic scenarios investigate the cases in which public 
investment not only increases the overall capital stock, but in addition raises total factor productivity in 
export-oriented sectors (scenarios 1a–4a) or domestic sectors (scenarios 1b–4b).  
                                                       
6The consortium of oil companies comprises Tullow Oil, Kosmos Energy, and several other small-scale operators. 
7 We adopt the—from the current perspective—more optimistic view that oil prices will average US$80 per barrel over the 
simulation period. However, assuming a lower oil price will not change the general direction of the results. 
8 We do not consider the case in which royalties are used to finance additional recurrent public expenditure, although a 
higher public capital stock might provide a case for additional expenditure. 
9  Since we assume that oil revenues are invested abroad, interest revenue also includes revaluation gains and losses.  
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save and what proportion to spend, do not yet seem to be determined, and the public consultation process 
has remained limited.  
To help in understanding the design of the scenarios, we first provide a simple model to formalize 
the allocation between government savings and spending, assuming that the government follows a fiscal 
rule to allocate oil revenues either to the fiscal budget or to an oil fund. In this case, total (additional) 
government spending in the current period is given by  
totgovspen dt  = a1 ⋅ oilrevt + withdrawt 
  = a1 ⋅ oilrevt + a2 ⋅ oilfundt-1  (3) 
With 0 < a1, a2 < 1, the two parameters determine how much of current oil revenues (oilrev) are allocated 
into the fiscal budget (a1) and how much are added from accumulated assets (withdraw) out of an oil fund 
(a2). The accumulation of assets in the oil fund are, in turn, given by the stock of assets in the previous 
period that increase due to savings out of current oil revenues and decrease due to withdrawals because of 
additional government spending:  
  oilfundt   = oilfundt-1 + (1- a1) oilrevt – a2 ⋅ oilfundt-1 
    = (1- a2) oilfundt-1 + (1- a1) oilrevt.
10
The implications of this simple rule are shown in Figure 1, where we assumed an inflow on oil 
revenues of 10 each period, starting in period 4 and lasting until period 20. As can be seen, the fiscal rule 
smoothes the impact of oil revenues on the fiscal budget where the “spending” parameter a1 determines 
the (positive) shock at the beginning of oil revenue inflows and the “stretching” parameter a2 determines 
the live time of the oil fund. For our model simulations we adopted an intermediate parameter 
constellation (0.5/0.15) with a spending parameter allocating 50 percent of current oil revenues into the 
fiscal budget, an amount that is topped up by withdrawals of 15 percent of the oil fund stock in the 
previous period.  
  (4) 
Figure 1. Additional spending and asset accumulation before, during, and after oil inflows (percent 
of initial GDP) 
 
                                                       
10 Equations (3) and (4) imply that the government decides on net savings out of oil revenues in each period. For the 
formulation of the allocation rule in terms of net savings, see Breisinger et al. (2009). For an application to aid inflows, see Adam 













Spending (percent of GDP) 
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Figure 1. (Continued) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation for a simulated inflow of oil revenue of 10 units from period 3 to 20. Simulations show parameter 
combinations of a1/ a2 (see equations 3 and 4 in the text). 
 
In terms of equations (3) and (4), we evaluate the following alternative scenarios: 
OIL1: all oil revenues are spent, i.e.,             a1 = 1, and a1 = 0  
OIL2: all oil revenues are saved, i.e.,                               a1 = 0, and a2 = 0 
OIL3: a 5 percent budget support, i.e.,                             a1 = 0.05 x GDP/OIL, and a1 = 0 
OIL4: smoothing oil-revenue spending, in which        a1 = 0.5, and a2 = 0.15  
In the next step, we design four scenarios to measure the direct and indirect effects of oil revenues 
that stem from additional public spending or savings, ignoring possible spillover effects of public 
investments on productivity growth in the economy. Thus, we develop two additional sets of scenarios to 
evaluate the joint effect of an increase in oil revenues that leads to productivity growth. In scenarios 1a–
4a the productivity spillover effects are assumed to occur in the export-oriented sectors, while in scenarios 
1b–4b such spillover effects are assumed to occur in the domestic sectors. For example, public investment 
in telecommunications infrastructure, trade fairs, and so on is likely to affect the production of tradable 
goods, while the provision and maintenance of rural roads, the funding of agricultural research, or the 
establishment of local marketplaces increases productivity in the domestic sectors. Given that there is 
very little empirical consensus on the size of the productivity effects of infrastructure investments in 
developing economies, we assume a value of 0.5 for the spillover parameter in equation (2), that is, ρsg = 
0.50 in both cases.
11
For each scenario, the average annual changes for selected variables over three periods (2007–
2009, 2007–2013, and 2007–2027) are reported. To simplify the presentation, we report only a small 
number of key aggregate variables in tables: the real exchange rate, total and sectoral exports, real GDP, 
total and government fixed investment, and real consumption of rural and urban households. At given 
 This value is comparably higher than the values estimated by Hulten (1996), who 
studies the relationship of infrastructure capital and economic growth. This higher value reflects in part 
the expectation of a higher marginal product of public capital for countries with a severely depleted 
capital stock and in part the likelihood that the contemporary marginal productivity of public 
infrastructure expenditure in Ghana may be higher than the historical point estimates suggest.  
                                                       
11  This implies that a 10 percent rise in total public capital stock relative to sectoral output induces a 5 percent increase in 



















constant income-tax rates and given savings rates, the changes in real consumption reflect changes in real 
disposable income.  
OIL1: A “Spend All” Strategy Fosters Growth, yet Leads to Dutch Disease Effects and Hurts 
Rural Households 
In scenario 1, the primary impact of oil revenues is an increase in public investment, which leads to a 
higher level of real GDP growth in both the short and medium term compared to the baseline (see Table 
2). The real exchange rate appreciates modestly in the short run, which is mainly due to the assumed high 
adjustment flexibility in foreign trade and domestic factor markets. However, increases in investment 
demand induce significant changes in the terms of trade and a sizable contraction in exports in favor of 
higher production of domestic goods. 
These Dutch disease effects weaken over time, yet the effect of relative price changes on the cost 
of capital goods persists. This implies that although these changes moderate over time, the initial decline 
in export performance does not reverse drastically, and hence initial welfare gains increase only slightly 
in the long run. 
Total household income increases in real terms from the base run, yet the gains are not distributed 
equally across household groups. While the income levels of urban households increase, rural household 
incomes fall in the short run and remain largely unchanged in the long run. The main reason for these 
increasing disparities between rural and urban households is demand-side effects. Additional government 
investment is primarily spent on capital goods and construction, raising the relative prices for these 
mainly urban sectors. Moreover, the backward linkages from these urban industrial sectors to the 
agricultural sectors, from which many rural households earn their income, are weak. In addition, the 
agricultural export sector is hurt by exchange rate appreciation, which exacerbates the negative effects for 
rural households. As later results show, these demand-side effects may be largely offset when oil 
revenues are used for productivity-enhancing investments but may reemerge and increase when relative 
price effects turn against agriculture. 
OIL2: A “save all and Invest Interest Only” Strategy has very Limited Growth Effects  
In scenarios 2–4, all or part of the oil revenues are saved in an oil fund (as foreign assets) and only 
interest earned from the fund is used to finance investments. In scenario 2, a moderate but permanent 
income stream generated from interest earnings finances additional investment of a modest 1.7 and 1.4 
percentage points in the short and long run, respectively. Thus, there is now less cumulative growth in 
GDP both in the short and long term and a marked reduction in total investment compared to scenario 1. 
As a consequence, relative price changes are less pronounced in the short run but increase over time with 
increasing income from interest. Total exports decline in the short run but increase in the long run, 
compared with the baseline. However, the changes are significantly smaller than in scenario 1. 
The short- and long-run effects on household incomes are significantly smaller than in scenario 1. 
Savings to create the oil fund largely avoid the short-run reduction of rural households’ income. In the 
long run, rural households’ income is not affected by the decision to either spend or save oil revenues, 
indicating the need for more targeted spending to raise rural households’ income. 
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Table 2. Impacts of oil revenue inflows on selected economic variables in the model simulations, 
without consideration of productivity spillovers from public investments (percentage-point changes 
compared to base-run growth rates) 
Experiment  Period  BASE  OIL1  OIL2  OIL3  OIL4 
      Spending  Saving  Budget 
Support  Smoothing 
Exchange rate  to T = 2009  0         
  to T = 2013  -0.1  -0.2  0  -0.1  -0.2 
   to T = 2027  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
Exports  to T = 2009  5.7         
  to T = 2013  5.9  -4.6  -0.7  -1.9  -3.5 
  to T = 2027  7.1  1.1  0.3  0.7  1 
Agriculture  to T = 2009  7.5         
  to T = 2013  6.6  -5.3  -0.7  -2.5  -3.9 
  to T = 2027  3.3  -3.3  -1.7  -2.7  -3.1 
Mining  to T = 2009  4.3         
  to T = 2013  5.9  -4.3  -0.9  -1.7  -3.5 
  to T = 2027  9.9  2.1  0.9  1.5  1.9 
Services  to T = 2009  4.2         
  to T = 2013  3.9  -3  -0.5  -1.4  -2.2 
   to T = 2027  2.9  -1.3  -0.7  -1.1  -1.2 
Real GDP  to T = 2009  4.6         
  to T = 2013  4.8  0.6  0.1  0.3  0.4 
   to T = 2027  5.4  0.7  0.4  0.6  0.7 
Investment  to T = 2009  6.1         
  to T = 2013  6.2  9  1.7  4.4  7.1 
  to T = 2027  6.8  2.1  1.4  2  2.1 
Government investment           
  to T = 2009  6.3         
  to T = 2013  6.4  16.8  17  16.9  16.9 
   to T = 2027  7.1  3.4  3.6  3.6  3.5 
Real income             
Rural  to T = 2009  3.9         
  to T = 2013  3.9  -0.4  0  -0.2  -0.3 
  to T = 2027  4.1  0  0  0  0 
Urban  to T = 2009  5.2         
  to T = 2013  5.4  0.8  0.1  0.4  0.6 
   to T = 2027  6  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.5 
Real wage  to T = 2009  1.9         
  to T = 2013  2.2  1.2  0.1  0.5  0.9 
   to T = 2027  2.8  0.8  0.4  0.6  0.7 




OIL3: Supporting the Budget with Oil Revenues Stabilizes the Debt Ratio, yet Only Modestly 
Accelerates Growth Due to Dutch Disease Effects 
While scenarios 1 and 2 represent two extreme cases of oil revenue allocation, scenarios 3 and 4 consider 
a strategy in which the government decides to save only part of oil revenues in the oil fund. In the case of 
scenario 3, we assume that, starting with the inflows of oil revenues in 2010, an oil revenue equivalent of 
5 percent of GDP is retained to support the public budget. Compared to scenario 2, this allocation rule 
results in both increasing savings in the oil fund and increasing investment until 2013. As expected, an 
increase in investment demand results in a worsening of the terms of trade in the short term, with the 
above-mentioned consequences. After 2013, with stagnant oil revenues but increasing GDP, savings 
deposited into the oil fund decrease steadily. However, increasing interest revenue from the oil fund still 
allows for an increase in investment and GDP growth over the whole simulation period. Impacts are 
comparable to those of scenario 1, yet with less short-run adjustment cost for rural households. 
OIL4: In the Long Run, Smoothing Oil-Revenue Spending Balances Growth, Distribution, and 
Stability Targets 
The allocation rule in scenario 4 implies that savings in the oil fund increase with rising oil revenues and 
decrease with a rise in savings stocks. Thus, given the parameterization indicated above, savings in the oil 
fund increase between 2010 and 2013 and start decreasing thereafter, until 2027. The long-run 
macroeconomic, sectoral, and distributional outcomes are comparable to those of scenario 1, in which all 
oil revenues are immediately invested as they flow in. However, compared to spending oil revenues 
immediately (scenario 2), saving part of the revenues in an oil fund has the obvious advantage of 
providing income from interest, even after the oil boom. In addition, the short-run adjustment costs with 
respect to exports and rural incomes are significantly lower than in the spending scenario. 
Robustness Check: Productivity Improvements Due to Investments Accelerate Growth and Can 
Offset Dutch Disease Effects  
In scenarios 1a–4a and 1b–4b, public investments raise the productivity in the economy. The absence of 
productivity increases in domestic production (in 1a–4a) leads to a stronger appreciation of the real 
exchange rate compared to scenarios 1–4 (see Table 3). Hence, although the export performance of 
traditional cash crops and services is significantly stronger because of the productivity bias, mining 
exports are hit relatively hard, with no productivity effect. When the productivity gain is biased toward 
production of domestic goods (in 1b–4b), outcomes are markedly different (Table 4). The bias in 
production (which increases the supply of nontradables and import substitutes) partly offsets the demand 
effects of the increased foreign exchange inflows so that the initial real exchange rate appreciation is 
reversed, even in the short run. Yet the effects on exports are symmetrical with those in scenarios 1–4; 
cash crop exports are hit even harder, while services exports are less affected and mining exports recover 
less than in earlier experiments. Overall export performance is weaker with a domestic bias than with an 
export bias. The domestic-biased supply response also leads to a larger improvement in the long-run fiscal 
balance, reflecting favorable relative price movements as well as the effects of higher growth and 
investment than in either the case without productivity effects or export-biased forms of productivity 
growth. 
The most striking difference between scenarios 1a–4a and 1b–4b is the effect on households’ 
disposable real income. Compared to the case of no productivity effects, productivity effects induced by 
public investment lead to higher real income growth for both household groups. However, the income 
gain is spread somewhat differently across household groups, with rural households benefitting less than 
urban households when productivity effects are biased toward domestic production. This contrasts sharply 
with the export-biased supply response, which generates a lower aggregate real income gain in the long 
run but favors rural households.   
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Table 3. Impacts of oil revenue inflows on selected economic variables in the model, with 
consideration of productivity spillovers from public investment in export sectors (percentage-point 
changes compared to base-run growth rates) 
Experiment  Period  BASE  OIL1  OIL2  OIL3  OIL4 
      Spending  Saving  Budget 
Support  Smoothing 
Exchange rate  to T = 2009  0  0.1       
  to T = 2013  -0.1  -0.5  0  -0.2  -0.3 
   to T = 2027  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Exports  to T = 2009  5.7  -0.2       
  to T = 2013  5.9  -1.5  -0.7  -0.7  -1.3 
  to T = 2027  7.1  0.9  -0.2  0.4  0.7 
Agriculture  to T = 2009  7.5  -1.6       
  to T = 2013  6.6  -1.8  -0.9  -1.2  -1.6 
  to T = 2027  3.3  2.9  2.5  2.7  2.8 
Mining  to T = 2009  4.3  0.9       
  to T = 2013  5.9  -1.2  -0.5  -0.5  -1.1 
  to T = 2027  9.9  -0.1  -1.4  -0.7  -0.2 
Services  to T = 2009  4.2  0.7       
  to T = 2013  3.9  -1.9  -0.6  -0.2  -1.3 
   to T = 2027  2.9  2.6  0.3  2.4  2.5 
Real GDP  to T = 2009  4.6  0       
  to T = 2013  4.8  1.2  0.1  0.6  0.9 
   to T = 2027  5.4  0.9  0.3  0.7  0.8 
Investment  to T = 2009  6.1  0       
  to T = 2013  6.2  9.1  1.7  4.8  7.2 
  to T = 2027  6.8  2.3  1.4  2.1  2.3 
Government investment           
  to T = 2009  6.3  0.1       
  to T = 2013  6.4  16.9  17  16.9  16.9 
   to T = 2027  7.1  3.5  3.7  3.7  3.6 
Real income             
Rural  to T = 2009  3.9  0       
  to T = 2013  3.9  0.4  0  0.2  0.3 
  to T = 2027  4.1  0.5  0.1  0.4  0.5 
Urban  to T = 2009  5.2  0       
  to T = 2013  5.4  1.3  0.1  0.6  0.9 
   to T = 2027  6  0.4  0  0.3  0.4 
Real wage  to T = 2009  1.9  0       
  to T = 2013  2.2  1.8  0.1  0.8  1.3 
   to T = 2027  2.4  1.4  0.8  1.2  1.4 
Source: DCGE model results 
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Table 4. Impacts of oil revenue inflows on selected economic variables in the model, with 
consideration of productivity spillovers from public investment in domestic sectors (percentage-
point changes compared to base-run growth rates) 
Experiment  Period  BASE  OIL1  OIL2  OIL3  OIL4 
      Spending  Saving  Budget 
Support  Smoothing 
Exchange rate  to T = 2009  0  0       
  to T = 2013  -0.1  0  0.1  0.1  0.1 
   to T = 2027  -0.2  0  0  0  0 
Exports  to T = 2009  5.7  -0.1       
  to T = 2013  5.9  -5.1  -0.8  -2.2  -3.9 
  to T = 2027  7.1  0.8  0.1  0.4  0.7 
Agriculture  to T = 2009  7.5  0.1       
  to T = 2013  6.6  -5.8  -0.8  -2.7  -4.2 
  to T = 2027  3.3  -3.5  -1.9  -2.9  -3.4 
Mining  to T = 2009  4.3  -0.1       
  to T = 2013  5.9  -5.2  -1.1  -2.1  -4.2 
  to T = 2027  9.9  1.7  0.6  1.1  1.6 
Services  to T = 2009  4.2  0.1       
  to T = 2013  3.9  -2.7  -0.3  -1.2  -2 
   to T = 2027  2.9  -1.2  -0.6  -0.9  -1.1 
Real GDP  to T = 2009  4.6  0.1       
  to T = 2013  4.8  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.7 
   to T = 2027  5.4  1  0.6  0.8  1 
Investment  to T = 2009  6.1  0       
  to T = 2013  6.2  9  1.7  4.7  7.1 
  to T = 2027  6.8  1.1  1.5  2.1  2.2 
Government investment           
  to T = 2009  6.3  0.1       
  to T = 2013  6.4  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.2 
   to T = 2027  7.1  3.7  4  3.9  3.8 
Real income             
Rural  to T = 2009  3.9  0       
  to T = 2013  3.9  -0.1  0  0  -0.1 
  to T = 2027  4.1  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.3 
Urban  to T = 2009  5.2  0.1       
  to T = 2013  5.4  1.1  0.2  0.6  0.8 
   to T = 2027  6  0.9  0.5  0.7  0.8 
Real wage  to T = 2009  1.9  0.3       
  to T = 2013  2.2  1.7  0.2  0.8  1.2 
   to T = 2027  2.8  1.2  0.7  1  1.2 
Source: DCGE model results 
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Comparing Strategies: The Oil Fund will Provide Revenues Long after Oil Resources are 
Depleted 
Figure 2 summarizes the difference in oil-related revenues between a situation with and without an oil 
fund. We compare the simulation results with the base run and show the deviations in terms of real GDP 
adjusted for interest income from the oil fund on the basis of an interest rate held constant at 5 percent. 
This comparison shows that the loss in terms of income between scenario 1 and scenarios 2 or 3 is 
modest. For scenario 2, GDP plus interest is about 1.5 (1.2) percent lower in 2013 (2027), indicating that 
the gap closes over time. For scenario 3, in which oil revenues worth about 5 percent of GDP are 
allocated to each year’s fiscal budget, the gap is even smaller and accounts for only 0.2 percent in 2027. 
For scenario 4, in which oil-revenue spending is smoothed over time according to two parameters for 
current spending and for drawing out of the oil fund, the GDP figures adjusted for additional interest 
income are even larger than in scenario 1. Given that the oil fund allows the country to continue to enjoy 
the income generated from oil even after the end of the oil era, this scenario appears to be the best option 
for long-run growth and stability.  
Figure 2. GDP plus interest on oil fund, deviation from base (percent of GDP) 
 




5.  SPENDING VERSUS SAVING OIL REVENUES: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has examined the potential trade-offs between spending and saving oil revenues in terms of 
growth, income distribution, and stability in Ghana. Consistent with the empirical evidence on the Dutch 
disease effects characteristic of resource booms, we found that in a scenario in which all oil revenues are 
spent as they flow in, the growth effect is largest in the short run. However, this short-term advantage 
declines over time and comes at the cost of significant negative effects for nonmineral export sector 
performance and rural households. We have therefore considered several other oil revenue allocation 
options. We show that over the long run the differences between spending- and saving-based allocation 
options are relatively small, as interest earned from the oil fund can be used to finance investments in the 
long run. Taking this longer-run perspective, a big push strategy appears even less promising given its 
relatively modest longer-term growth impacts compared to oil fund options. Smoothing oil revenue 
allocations into the fiscal budget by saving part of the inflow in an oil fund appears to be the preferred 
option: results show that it is preferable not only for growth and stability but also for equality, mainly 
because the negative short-run effects on agriculture are significantly moderated. Yet, in all scenarios, 
agriculture and rural areas tend to grow less relative to nonagricultural sectors and urban areas, suggesting 
that more targeted investments are needed to accelerate rural income growth. Results indicate that using 
oil revenues to increase agricultural productivity and improve rural competitiveness has the potential to 
offset the Dutch disease effects and make an important contribution to economywide growth. 
These positive impacts of an oil-fund-based allocation rule might yet be underestimated. 
Establishing an oil fund implies the accumulation of assets, which are available to the budget in the post-
oil era after 2027. For example, in the extreme case of scenario 2, in which all oil revenues are saved, the 
size of the oil fund will be equivalent to the level of GDP by 2027 (assuming average oil prices of US$80 
per barrel). Income from interest earned from this fund will be about 4.85 percent of GDP (assuming a 5 
percent interest rate). Even with the more moderate accumulation in scenarios 3 and 4, incomes generated 
from the oil fund will still be considerable, amounting to about 2.3 and 0.7 percent of GDP, respectively. 
Hence, with an oil fund, oil revenues will make a substantial contribution to government revenues in the 
long run (see Appendix Table A.4).  
The creation of an oil fund can also help smooth global commodity price shocks. This function of 
an oil fund is especially important for countries like Ghana, which have a relatively high exposure to 
world market price volatility due to their relatively low level of export diversification and high import 
intensity for capital goods. The recent and ongoing global food, fuel, and financial crisis and the 
associated extreme volatility in world commodity prices further underline the importance of establishing 
an oil fund to cope with future shocks. The fact that we did not consider this additional positive effect in 
this paper suggests that the estimated positive effects of an oil-fund-based allocation rule might be even 
greater.  
Reaping the benefits of an oil-fund-based allocation rule will require improved government 
capacity in managing macroeconomic policies. Moreover, oil revenues are likely to challenge the 
country’s government in terms of addressing inefficiencies and the corruption often associated with 
resource rents. Clear and transparent rules will be needed to guide future revenues from interest and the 
allocation of spending. This paper has provided an example of how such a rule can be designed to further 






Table A.1. Economic structure in the base year, Ghana, 2007 
Sector  VAshr  PRDshr  EMPshr  EXPshr  EXP-
OUTshr  IMPshr  IMP-
DEMshr 
Domestic agriculture  23.5  19.5  15.8      6.6  11.3 
Export agriculture  9.9  8.2  8.1  42.2  79.6      
Mining  8.7  7.3  4.3  44.3  96.2      
Manufacturing  10.0  14.7  13.0      76.9  63.1 
Industry  4.1  9.1  3.2      16.4  34.8 
Construction  10.6  7.8  11.2          
Private services  20.2  25.8  26.4  13.5  8.3      
Public services  13.0  7.5  18.1          
TOTAL-2  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  15.7  100.0  27.8 
Total agriculture  33.3  27.8  23.8  42.2  23.6  6.6  10.5 
Total nonagriculture  66.7  72.2  76.2  57.8  12.7  93.4  32.3 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  15.7  100.0  27.8 
Source: Appendix Table A.2 and DCGE model results 
Notes: 
VAshr: Sector share of total value-added 
PRDshr: Sector share of total production 
EMPshr: Sector share of total labor income 
EXPshr: Sector share of total export revenues 
EXP-OUTshr: Share of exports in output 
IMPshr: Sector share of total imports  
IMP-DEMshr: Share of imports in sectoral absorption  
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Table A.2.  2007 Ghana SAM 
 
 
Notes: Activities: domestic agriculture, export agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, private services, public services; commodities: domestic agriculture, export agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, private services, public services; factors: labor, land, capital; households: rural, urban, inter-household transfers (thh); taxes: direct taxes, sales 
taxes, import taxes, export taxes; S-I: savings and investment; ROW: rest of the world 









cagrd 545 484 114 2,465 1,790 179 5,577
cagre 2 60 324 11 1,657 2,054
cmine 13 55 1,638 1,706
cmanu 223 345 331 538 553 412 531 37 2,497 3,072 1,920 673 11,132
cindu 43 12 197 443 937 25 1,458 23 446 665 4,248
ccons 49 42 1,813 1,904
cprvs 992 348 125 475 184 68 1,945 132 29 317 53 399 658 1,353 964 8,041
cpubs 33 35 1,791 1,859
lab 1,061 546 273 847 212 751 1,932 1,238 6,860
cap 170 163 779 387 300 591 847 428 3,667
land 1,737 544 2,282
hrur 1,156 2,095 2,282 564 410 6,508
hurb 5,704 1,571 872 1,656 9,803
thh -535 535 0
gov 1,252 1,575 775 34 1,303 4,939
dtax 1,252 1,252
stax 515 708 3 349 1,575
mtax 130 640 5 775
etax 34 34
s-i 944 1,101 1,594 93 3,733
row 645 6,149 1,247 415 118 8,574
total 4,773 2,021 1,706 3,512 2,235 1,901 6,879 1,859 5,577 2,054 1,706 11,132 4,248 1,904 8,041 1,859 6,860 3,667 2,282 6,508 9,803 4,939 1,252 1,575 775 34 3,733 8,574 334,218 
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Table A.3. Expenditure shares and elasticities by household groups 
  hrur  hurb 
  Average expenditure shares (percent) 
cagrd  0.404  0.259 
cmanu  0.409  0.444 
cindu  0.073  0.096 
cprvs  0.108  0.196 
cpubs  0.005  0.005 
Total  1.000  1.000 
  Income elasticities of demand 
  0.9  0.9 
Source: See text 
 
Table A.4. Growth vs. accumulation: Deviation of GDP and oil fund from base run (100 million 
cedis in constant 2007 prices) 
   2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2021  2027 
GDP               
Oil1  1.69  3.30  5.73  7.94  10.31  32.73  63.25 
Oil2  0.15  0.34  0.65  1.10  1.69  11.01  30.16 
Oil3  1.16  1.93  2.87  3.99  5.30  21.28  49.18 
Oil4  1.06  2.18  3.93  5.70  7.71  29.02  59.93 
Oil Fund                      
Oil1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Oil2  6.95  23.53  47.04  74.86  102.75  297.95  465.27 
Oil3  2.49  9.96  23.94  41.79  59.23  165.74  228.30 
Oil4  2.95  9.56  18.12  27.22  34.99  64.90  73.69 
GDP + Interest                      
Oil1  1.69  3.30  5.73  7.94  10.31  32.73  63.25 
Oil2  0.50  1.52  3.00  4.84  6.83  25.91  53.42 
Oil3  1.28  2.43  4.07  6.08  8.26  29.57  60.60 
Oil4  1.21  2.66  4.84  7.06  9.46  32.27  63.61 




Table B.1. Mathematic presentation of DCGE model: sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Sets       
  Activities 
 
Commodities not in CE 
 
Activities with a Leontief 






  Commodities 
 
Commodities not in CM 
 
Commodities with domestic 
sales of domestic output   
Commodities with domestic 
production  
 




Exported commodities  
 
Households 
Equation parameters     
 
Consumer price index  
 
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
 
Weight of commodity c in the 
CPI   
Export price (foreign currency) 
 
Quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a   
Share for domestic institution i 
in income of factor f 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per unit of c’ 
produced and sold domestically 
 
Share of net income of i’ to i (i’ 
∈ INSDNG’; i ∈ INSDNG) 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per exported unit of 
c’ 
 
Tax rate for activity a 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per imported unit of 
c’  
 
Exogenous direct tax rate for 
domestic institution i 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
 
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
 
Import tariff rate 
 
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i    
Rate of sales tax 
aA ∈ () c CEN C ∈⊂
() a ALEO A ∈⊂ () c CM C ∈⊂
cC ∈ () c CMN C ∈⊂
() c CD C ∈⊂ () c CX C ∈⊂
() c CDN C ∈⊂ fF ∈
() c CE C ∈⊂ () h H INSDNG ∈⊂
cpi
i mps01
c cwts c pwe
ca ica if shif
' cc icd ' ii shii
' cc ice a ta
' cc icm i tins
a inta i tins01
a iva c tm
i mps c tq 
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Table B.2. (Continued) 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Equation parameters, continued     
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES activity 
function   
CET function share parameter 
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES value-
added function   
CES value-added function share 
parameter for factor f in activity a 
 
Shift parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function   
Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
 
Armington function shift parameter 
 
Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
 
CET function shift parameter 
      
CES production function exponent 
 
Capital sectoral mobility factor 
 
CES value-added function exponent 
 
Marginal share of consumption spending 
on marketed commodity c for household 
h 
 
Domestic commodity aggregation 
function exponent 
 
CES activity function share parameter 
 
Armington function exponent 
 
Share parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function   
CET function exponent 
 
Armington function share parameter 
 
Sector share of new capital 
 
Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous variables     
 
Foreign savings (FCU) 
 
Government consumption demand for 
commodity 
 
Marginal propensity to save for domestic 
nongovernment institution (exogenous 
variable) 
 
Base-year quantity of private investment 
demand 
 
Import price (foreign currency) 
 
Transfer from factor f to institution i 
 
Quantity of stock change 
 
Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
 
Quantity supplied of factor     
Endogenous variables     
 
Average capital rental rate in time period 
t   
Quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
  Investment adjustment factor 
 
Quantity of commodity c as intermediate 
input to activity a 
  Government expenditures 
 
Quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
 
Consumption spending for household 
 
Quantity of imports of commodity c 
  Exchange rate (LCU per unit of FCU) 
 
Activity price (unit gross revenue) 
  Government savings 
 
Demand price for commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
 
Quantity demanded of factor f from 
activity a   
Export price (domestic currency) 
 
Quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h   
Aggregate intermediate input price for 
activity a  
 
Quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c from 
activity a for household h 
 









































i mps c qinv
c pwm    if trnsfr
c qdst fa wfdist
f qfs
a










fa QF cr PE
ch QH a PINTA
ach QHA ft PK 
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Table B.2. (Continued) 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Endogenous variables, continued     
 
Import price (domestic currency) 
 
Aggregated quantity of domestic output 
of commodity 
 
Composite commodity price  
  
Quantity of output of commodity c from 
activity a 
 
Value-added price (factor income per unit 
of activity)   
Transfers from institution i’ to i (both in 
the set INSDNG) 
 
Aggregate producer price for commodity  
 
Average price of factor 
 
Producer price of commodity c for 
activity a    
Income of factor f 
 
Quantity (level) of activity     Government revenue 
 
Quantity sold domestically of domestic 
output    
Income of domestic nongovernment 
institution 
 
Quantity exported of domestic output 
 
Income to domestic institution i from 
factor f 
 
Quantity of goods supplied to domestic 
market (composite supply)   
Quantity of new capital by activity a for 
time period t 
 
Quantity of (aggregate) value-added     
 
 
cr PM c QX
c PQ ac QXAC
a PVA ' ii TRII
c PX f WF
ac PXAC f YF
a QA YG
c QD i YI







Table B.3. Mathematical presentation of DCGE model: model equations 
Production and price equations   
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a va vaf va vaf
fa f a a fa fa fa fa fa fa
fF
W WFDIST PVA QVA QF QF





⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅ 
 ∑
a aa QVA iva QA = ⋅
a aa QINTA inta QA = ⋅
(1 ) a aa a a a a PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅
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c CT
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Institutional incomes and domestic demand equations   
 
(23) 
  (24) 
 
(25) 
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 =    QQ QD QM +∑
( ) 1 c c c c c cr cr
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f f fa fa
aA
YF  = WF   wfdist QF
∈
⋅⋅ ∑
if if f YIF  = shif YF ⋅
'
''
i i f i i i gov i row
f F i INSDNG
YI  =  YIF TRII trnsfr cpi trnsfr EXR
∈∈
+ + ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑
' ' ' '' ii ii i i i TRII  = shii (1-mps ) (1-tins ) YI ⋅⋅⋅
( ) 11 h ih h h h
i INSDNG
EH  =  shii mps (1-tins ) YI
∈






c c h c ch ch h c c h
cC
PQ QH  = PQ EH PQ γβ γ
∈

⋅ ⋅+⋅ − ⋅ 
 ∑
cc QINV  = IADJ qinv ⋅
c c i gov
c C i INSDNG
EG PQ qg trnsfr cpi
∈∈
= ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑
ii c c c c cc
i INSDNG c CMNR c C
gov f gov row
fF








c ca ch c c c
aA hH
QQ QINT QH qg QINV qdst
∈∈






YG EG GSAV = +
cr cr cr cr i row
r c CMNR r c CENR i INSD
pwm QM pwe QE trnsfr fsav
∈ ∈∈
⋅ = ⋅+ + ∑ ∑∑
( ) 1 i i i c c cc
i INSDNG c C c C
mps tins YI GSAV EXR fsav PQ QINV PQ qdst
∈ ∈∈
⋅− ⋅ + + ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ∑ ∑∑ 
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Table B.3. (Continued) 
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